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Article 13

A Right to Health Care
Fact or Fiction?
Robert Barnet

Doctor Barnet, a Reno physician, is afrequent contributor to Linacre
Quarterly. He has been taking studies at Notre Damefor a master's degree
in theology.

The notion of a right to health care is a relatively recent concept. The
importance of considering such a concept has increased because of
changing human experience and parallel societal developments . Ideas on
sociiiljustice have, at the same time, evolved, reflecting a new and different
reality. What medicine can and does do differently than it did 50 or 100
years ago is part of the change. Since the 1970s cataclysmic developments
in medical technology as well as radical changes in health care delivery
patterns have left much of American society with a tenuous grasp of what
they perceive as necessary to assure for them a ' healthful life . This
insecurity is most prevalent among those who , especially when ill, are the
most disadvantaged - the poor, the young, the elderly and the marginally
employed . In the 1980s, the importance of examining the subject of social
justice and health care has become even more crucial because of growing
economic influences in health care delivery. In this context, this paper will
examine the meaning, track and history, and consider the implications of
the term "right to health care".
There are several ways to approach the question of whether there is a
right to health care. A basic distinction might be to examine the question
of whether health care is a basic human right, or natural right, such as "life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness", or whether it is a right coming out of
social contract. Rights typically involve the question of entitlement or the
right to "something". Although the rights language has its origin in the late
Middle Ages, it is not clear at all what the concept of entitlement was like
even in the time of Aristotle . Although the language is of relatively recent
origin, this does not exclude the possibility that the concept of entitlement
and right is an ancient one. It is possible, if we examine the claim to a
specific right in contemporary society, that historical changes may have
occurred which make it, because of the changes in society, something which
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is seen as necessary for the fulfillment of individuals. Because of that, it
may now be seen as a basic human right, even though it was not in the past.
A Clarification of 'Rights'
The topic of rights has been raised, and at this point, a clarification of
what is understood by rights is in order. By natural fundamental rights is
meant those rights which belong to man qua man, and which are included
in the words of the Declaration of Independence: "life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness". Some argue that these are the only "fundamental"
rights, and that a fundamental right is "an inalienable right without which
life as a human people would be untenable". I Lesser, a physician, contrasts
these fundamental rights with "qualified rights", which are derivative
rights. He would allow one to exercise these qualified rights only ifthey did
not interfere with other persons' rights . Lesser bases this position on social
contract theory. It would appear, however, that our society, at least , does
not make even fundamental rights absolute, contrary to Lesser's
contention. That is, we condone capital punishment (limiting right to life)
and there are certain circumstances under which freedom of speech (for
instance, yelling "fire" in the theatre) or liberty (almost all societies accept
some degree of imprisonment whether stockades or penitentiaries) are
restricted . Even fundamental rights, it would appear, can be qualified in
the same way that Lesser's qualified rights are qualified . That is , rights
certainly in Western society, appear to be relative and typically modified,
depending on the rights and liberty of others.
Although we can consider rights in the context of health care and ask
whether they are natural human rights, or rights coming out of a social
contract, there is a second way in which we can examine the subject - by
asking whether we are talking about opportunities for access, or a "right to
obtain" health. That is , is health something to which access must be
provided, or is there actual entitlement to health care as a product or
resource?
Arthur Caplan has suggested that in the 19th century, except for
veterans of the Civil War who were felt to have entitlement because of their
military service, there was no general sense of societal obligation to
provide health care. Caplan and Jennings2 describe health care in 19th
century America as being "viewed as both a luxury and a personal
responsibility". It also should be noted, considering the marginal level of
medicine available to most citizens during th 19th century in the United
States,3 that there was little perception of health care as something very
desirable . Concern about human rights centered around such questions as
slavery, the right to property, freedom of speech, and exploitation of the
working man . A living wage, the right to unionize, and humane working
conditions were major concerns during the latter part of the 19th century.
Until well into the 20th century, the vast majority of health care was
delivered by physicians with marginal training, who had little scientific
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expertise, and by practitioners of alternative forms of healing, including
folk medicine and homeopathy . There was a small professional elite to
whom the wealthy had access , but this certainly did not involve, at least in
the United States, the larger body of medical practitioners. It might be
argued that 100 years ago, given the limitations of the medical profession,
universal health care (as we know it today) was impossible, hence it was
not obligatory. "Ought" implies "can" and therefore the right to health
care was not only not sought, but was not possible.
Papal Statements and Pastoral Letters
The question of whether there is a right to health care was one which I
suggest, was not asked a century ago because it was not a meaningful
question in our society. That would have indicated that at that time it was
not considered a fundamental human right. Papal encyclicals are often a
reflection of the concerns present in the broader society and can be
important historical markers . With that in mind, let us examine some
documents covering the last 100 years. In the encyclical Rerum Novarum
(1891),4 Pope Leo XIII did talk of rights , but his emphasis was on the
importance of property rights. He called for the use of the "power and
authority of the law"5 if working conditions did not provide sufficient
opportunity for performing religious duties or resulted in harm to human
personality, to morals, or to human dignity. He touched on the subject of
health ifit became impaired because of "immoderate work." His approach
was essentially corrective or retributive where harm was done. If harm had
been done , he called on employers for limited aid which, he suggested,
involved removal of the danger or remedy of the evils. There is no
indication that Leo XIII saw any type of positive right involving
entitlement to any other types of health care, either from employers or
from the government. Leo XIII did express concern for the common good
and called for the worker to be "housed , clothed and secure".
The primary emphasis in "Rerum Novarum" was on humane working
conditions. The role of institutions or organizations (not the state) is
mentioned in the context of "associations for giving mutual aid".6 The role
of "agencies established by the foresight of private persons to care for the
worker, and likewise for his dependent wife and children in the event that
an accident, sickness or death befalls him ... " is mentioned. However,
"associations of workers" are given "first place" and are compared with
traditional guilds of artisans. 7 Leo calls upon the workers to adapt and
meet the changing needs , not the state. Rather than giving the state the
mandate to provide benefits, the encyclical is concerned with protecting
the rights of the workers to form organizations which can provide the
benefits.
A series of changes have taken place in the 20th century which are
important in evaluating the question of whether health care is now, even if
it was never before, a right. Prior to the 20th century, it was not a question
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to be asked; there was no question of right and therefore none of
entitlement. People had access to many alternative modes of care and
retained within their own hands much of the control of what they saw as
necessary to provide health . Rights did not become a question since there
was no desire for entitlement. Rights raise the question of access to
resources. When specific resources are virtually universally available, and
particularly if their value is relatively low (as grains of sand on the beach),
then the question is not one which is posed . Such was the status of health
care prior to this century. Everyone was essentially equal in regard to
health care which was not considered something dependent on how
advantaged one was. To have been given equal access to the benefits
available from health care was not perceived as a benefit because of several
factors. In part, the ability was freely available (as grains of sand) either in
the family or the community. In part, health care was not seen as a benefit
or goods on which one placed value, such as they might in humane
working conditions or free speech. In part , if it seemed to be a sought-after
benefit, it was ranked far below those other rights and benefits including
the "offices and positions" which were not open to all.
Wealthy's Financial Resources

For a few wealthy members of society, home visits, servants and access
to certain (often harmful) procedures, such as bleeding, were obtainable
because of financial resources . Such care was available only to a small
segment of the population, and primarily in urban centers. For the vast
majority of people, health care was not something controlled by the
government (like liberty in the 18th century). It was not like economic
opportunities thwarted by 19th century industrialism. It was not, like
bread and potatoes, essential for survival. It was not a limited resource
which, if one were deprived of it, did not allow for an ordinary existence.
For most individuals , health care was not limited by government, the
profession or ability to pay. From the 19th century perspective, health
care, such as it was, was virtually universally available.
However, when something is perceived as essential to the fulfillment of
man, and when there is difficulty in acquisition or retention of it, or when
entitlement is not clear, the question of rights can become an appropriate
one. The changes which have taken place in the 20th century in American
health care have made this an appropriate question. With scientific
development, the effectiveness of medicine and its ability to provide
significant improvement in health has expanded significantly. With this
has come at least a perception, which some would attribute to the
institutionalization of health care and the medicalization of many aspects
of our life,8 that health care is now perceived as something necessary for
man's fulfillment. Modern media and marketing not only have fostered
this perception, but have suggested that without this entitlement, men are
impotent, unequal, and not truly capable of fulfillment. There were some
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tentative moves, especially by labor unions in the early 20th century, to
add health benefits to union contracts, but such an agenda was not
generally supported until after the Second World War. In the 1950s, it did
become a major plank in liberal political movements . With changes in our
culture, man perceives that he cannot provide adequate health care by
himself, nor even by the mutual associations which Leo XIII suggested.
Forty years after "Rerum Novarum", there were major changes both in
social conditions and in health care. "Quadragesimo Anno" (1931) is an
important next marker in our historical narrative. 9 In this document on
social conditions, there is still no specific mention of a right to health care.
The document adds few specifics and, in fact, is less explicit on health than
"Rerum Novarum". The document does recognize social changes and an
increased role of the state. It indicates that the "function of the rulers of the
state . .. is a watch over the community and its part; ... in protecting
private individuals and their rights, chief consideration ought to be given
to the weak and the pOOr."1O It identifies new laws "wholly unknown to the
earlier time" which are directed to "protect vigorously the sacred rights of
the workers that flow from their dignity as men and as Christians. These
laws undertake the protection of life , health , strength, family, homes ,
workshops, wages and labor hazards .... " The document which updated
social concerns still does not speak explicitly of the need to include, in the
framework of the social structure, entitlement to health care.
John XXIII's Encyclical

Some 30 years later (1963)12 Pope John XXIII issued his Encyclical
" Pacem in Terris." Contained in it was the most forthright papal statement
as yet on the right to health care:
The right to life and a worthy standard of living.
II . Beginning our di scussion of the rights of man . we see that every ma n has the
right to life , to bodily integrity, and to the means which are suita ble for the proper
development of life; these are primarily food. clothing. shelter, rest , medical care.
and finally the necessa ry social services. Therefore a human being also has the
right to secu rity in cases of sickness , ina bility to work, widowhood. old age .
unemployment , or in any other case in which he is deprived of the means of
subsistance through no fault of his own."

The American Catholic bishops, in a pastoral letter of 1981, reaffirmed
this position stating:
I. Everyone has a right to adequate health care. This right flows from the sanctity
of human life and the dignity that belongs to all human perso ns .. . . It implies that
access to that health care which is necessa ry and suitable for the proper
development and maintenance of life must be provided for all people, regardless
of economic, social or legal status. Special attention should be given to meeting
the basic hea lth needs of the poor. With increasing limited resources in the
economy , it is the basic right of the poor that are frequently threatened first ...
2. ... Any comprehensive health system that is developed ... should use the
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cooperative resources of both the public and private sectors, voluntary, religious
and profit sectors.14
3. The benefits provided in national health care policy should be sufficient to
maintain and promote good health as well as to treat disease and disability.
Emphasis should be placed on the promotion of health , the prevention of disease,
and the adequate protection against environmental and other hazards to physical
and mental health. If health is viewed in an integrated and comprehensive
manner, the social and economic context of illness and health care must be an
important focus of concern and action ... Public policy should provide incentives
for preventive care, early intervention and alternative delivery systems.

The American Bishops emphasized that these and other principles
developed in this pastoral letter were based on their "belief in health care as
a basic human right", and called for a "national health insurance
program", which was seen to be a responsibility of the federal government
to establish . It called for the provision of a basic level of health care for all
Americans. Hence, in some 90 years, the papal encyclicals and pastoral
letters on health care had moved from a policy which recognized a need to
avoid harm to the health of the worker and a retributive approach to the
damages done. They now call for a very broad policy which includes not
only a right to health care, but also a call for an entitlement program which
the American federal government would have the mandate to undertake as
its moral responsibility. The provision of a health care system which would
provide for basic or adequate needs, was to be available to all, and would
emphasize especially the provision of entitlement for those least
advantaged in society. In 1982, Pope John Paul II again insisted on the
"primary right of every individual" to have "what is necessary for the care
of his health and therefore (a right) to adequate health care."'5
Scene Changes
By 1963, the political as well as the health care scene had changed.
National health insurance existed in Britain, and in 1964, with a new
Democratic Congress, the American Medicare Law was enacted. This law
was a reflection of the recognition and distress of the reality faced by
people with sickness. They no longer prepared their own remedies and
resorted , instead, to physicians and hospitals. This shift in medical care
was associated with an alteration in the social and economic relationships
of illness. A market economy with a loss of autonomy, necessary or not,
results. Charles Fried has commented on the changes and notes that a
careful analysis of the notion of a right to health care is crucial:
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that at least in American public discourse, the idea
of a right to health care developed into something which had the appearance of
inevitability only recently, in what might be called the intermediate, perhaps
golden, age of modern medicine. This was a period when advances in treating
acute illness, advances such as the antibiotics could really make a large difference
in prolonging life or restoring health; but the most elaborate technologies which
may make only marginal improvements in situations previously thought to be
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hopeless and had not yet been generally developed. In this recent "Golden Age"
we could unambiguously afford a notion of a general right to health care because
there were a number of clear successes available to medicine, and these successes
were not unduly costly. Having conquered the infectious diseases, medical
science has undertaken the degenerative diseases, the malignant neoplasms, the
diseases of unknown etiology; and one must say that the ratio between expense
and benefit has become exponentially more unfavorable. So it is really only now
that the notion of a right to health care poses acute analytical and social
problems. 16

We moved from a time (the 19th and early 20th century) when a right to
health care was not considered, to a time (the 1950s and 1960s) when it was
assumed to be a right. Now we have moved to a time when the concept is
questioned . It is questioned now because the entitlement which was , in
general, a reality, is now, for many, elusive.
Let us next consider how the foregoing discussion will fit into certain
theoretical frameworks of rights and justice. Major contemporary theories
of justice include utilitarianism, and those of Robert Nozick, and John
Rawls. I will review these theories and relate them both to the encyclicals
and to the questions which have been raised about the issue of a right to
health care.
Nozick on Justice
Robert Nozick, a libertarian, argues that the most fundamental element
oflife in our society is liberty, and that liberty should not be limited except
for extremely serious social reasons. He argues that each individual has the
right to what he / she possesses as long as he / she has acquired it justly. This
acquisition can be by discovering something, by gift, or through exchange.
The world he envisions is one in which every individ ual is free to make use
of his / her status in whatever way possible. Although clearly, in Nozick's
scenario, the individual must refrain from murder and robbery, he has no
obligation to redistribute income or anything else of value to the less
needy. One's liberties are inalienable and personal. The state, in this
libertarian view, has a very limited role which primarily involves providing
protection against unjust appropriation by others. Individuals, voluntarily
and out of the goodness of their hearts, might choose to act charitably
towards the less fortunate , but they are under no obligation to do so. It
follows , under Nozick's theory, that the state has a corresponding limited
duty which would not require that citizens be taxed in order to provide
special services such as health care to those who are in need.
Nozick does allow for contractual relationships, and if one chooses
freely to enter into such an arrangement in which one would agree to give
certain benefits to others in return for something, this would be acceptable.
Nozick would appear to grant no right even to access to health care to
other members of the community or even other basic needs such as food ,
clothing and shelter. If one had the ability to access health care, Nozick
would defend the right to retain that ability. N ozick rejects the idea of
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"distributive justice" and is concerned with "holdings". Holdings designate
what individuals have lawfully acquired, and because of that lawful
acquisition, they have entitlement. The fact of just holding determinesjust
distribution. This approach is in no sense egalitarian.
It is unlikely that Nozick would acknowledge an individual's right to
acquire even "adequate" health care. It is possible that he might extend his
ideas to include "very minimal health care" if it were absolutely necessary
to ensure life. This might be similar to Nozick's example of a man who
controls a waterhold in a desert. He should not be allowed to deny that
lifesaving water to others.
Lesser supports Nozick's argument with specifics and acknowledges
that a parallel in health care would be that "no one should be denied access
to penicillin for pneumococcal pneumonia in a time of surplus".! 7 He then
compares penicillin with water, as being lifesaving in a very specific
situation. Lesser, like Nozick, argues that the "right to health care should
be strictly limited to lifesaving, basic necessities". He argues that restraints
comparable to Nozick's waterhole example should be considered . Lesser,
who is a physician, further argues that one should be careful "not to
proliferate the concept of rights". It appears that his concern is the
extension of the obligation which would then require someone
(presumably health care professionals) to provide a product or service.
Don't Threaten Society

Lesser, in the language of Nozick , further argues that needs should not
be met in such a way as to threaten society. As an example of a situation in
which needs should not follow the most qualified rights in contrast to the
penicillin, Lesser argues that rehabilitation after a stroke should not be a
health care right because it would place a burden or obligation on those
who provide the service, and it is not "lifesaving". The niceties of society
such as "better housing, better transportation, safer jobs, better food , and
to be more beautiful", are, in the libertarian view, expecting too much. It is
not clear that Nozick would accept even Lesser's specific example, but
their line of reasoning is similar. Looking at the qualifying adjectives
which we have seen in the papal encyclicals, the libertarian view is very
protective of individual property, but would not extend the concept of
justice to provide "adequate or necessary", but only "lifesaving", health
care and then probably only in the instance that it did not impose a
significant, perhaps even measurable, burden on those who would be
required to give up something from their resources.
The libertarian view argues strongly for an older historical situation
which sees social benefits (such as hospitals, hospices etc.) arising from a
sense of charity and compassion rather than from a sense of rights and
obligations. It would follow then, under libertarian principles, that either
private resources or privately purchased insurance would fund virtually all
health care. Those without recourse to either one of these would be
May, 1988
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dependent on individuals and institutions functioning on the basis of
compassion. Inherent is the premise that sufficient funds would be
available in excess of the amount needed to sustain the health care system
in a strongly entrepreneurial economic environment. The high cost of
maintaining our current health care system without cost shifting to those
with considerable wealth, expensive insurance or to governmental entities,
makes such a solution virtually impossible to envision. Not only is
voluntarism less pervasive than in the past for many social reasons, but it
has been altered by institutionalization which often functions in a context
of entitlement rather than compassion. Alternative resources available to
those in need are considered when services are delivered. Even charitable
donations are strongly influenced by potential favorable tax advantages
which, in contemporary society, are seen as an entitlement. The libertarian
approach to health needs of the less fortunate, which is based on
voluntarism , seems unworkable in today's milieu . Some modification
which would provide limited catastrophic care (the desert water hole
approach) would also seem unworkable since it would exclude preventive
and basic health care. Both would remain effectively unattainable for
many. Many would flounder in the sands of modern society and die of
thirst on the way.
Utilitarianism

The utilitarian argument which in its simplest form argues "for the
greatest good for the greatest number", is rooted in the writings of John
Stewart Mill. From a policy standpoint, utilitarianism is one which is very
attractive in light of the problems of the limits on resources which our
society typically allocates to health care. However, in the context of
insuring individuals of the right of access to even a minimum, much less the
necessary, level of health care, a utilitarian approach does not satisfy
principles of social justice laid down , for instance, in either Rawls or the
papal encyclicals. The least advantaged may and, typically in our society,
do suffer. On the other end of the spectrum, the impact which very
expensive procedures have, although not a direct part of the formula, may
adversely affect the outcome even for the greatest number. This can occur
because if resources are directed into very expensive procedures for a
relatively small number without restriction, then the greatest good for the
greatest number may not be served. This is, in part, what is happening in
our contemporary scene. As more expensive technology and associated
costs have concentrated the expenditures on a relatively small number who
are either seriously ill or who are affluent, the total allocation to health care
after the cost for these procedures is significantly less than if we did not
have these procedures. Therefore, the residual resources, or residual good,
when reallocated, either becomes too expensive for most individuals or not
accessible to them. In practice then, although the United States has, in
terms of public policy, tended to follow utilitarian principles, there is
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significant stratification of the benefits. This has led people such as Robert
Veatch to argue for a distribution of access to health care on the basis of
needs. 18
Veatch's Proposal
Veatch has developed a theory of medical ethics which he applies to the
question of the level of health care which should be given to patients.
Veatch lists four principles, two of which are "patient centered" (i.e.,
user-oriented), and two which operate at the social level. The two patientcentered principles are "patient-centered beneficence" and autonomy. We
will use the term "user-oriented beneficence" for the former. These two
principles act to benefit the user and allow the user the right of selfdetermination. For Veatch, paternalistic acts which place constraints on
autonomy would be excluded, even if the individual benefitted.
The two principles which operate at the social level are justice and "full
beneficence". These principles require that access or distribution be on an
equal basis and that the resources be used to do the most good .
Since Veatch's two principles of full beneficence and justice are
presumed to be based on rights, it is appropriate to apply them to health
care. It follows that consumers of health care should be free to choose from
available (or predictable) resources in a manner beneficial to them.
According to Veatch's principles, they should be distributed so as to
provide an opportunity for equal access and to do the most good . This
appears to combine utilitarian principles and preserves the rights of the
disadvantaged.
There apparently are not any significant problems in applying Veatch's
principles of autonomy and patient-centered beneficence to health care.
Although individual agents may thwart autonomy in general , we operate
with the principle of autonomy as a general standard of action. Although
aberrations may occur in the implementation of patient (user) centered
beneficence (particularly adverse reactions and therapeutic misadventure
in medicine), the standard is clearly patient-centered beneficence.
(Although it is possible to make a case that a system based on patientcentered beneficence is not feasible in the light of the recent major increase
in entrepreneurism in health care, cost considerations are still not the
major determinant of the standards for individual medical interventions.
It may be necessary to implement public policy decisions which remove
entrepreneurism if a plan such as Veatch's is to work . This, in all
probability, would involve a National Health Service.).
As for Veatch's two principles which operate at the social level (justice
manifest as equal access opportunity and maximum good), it is not
apparent that they can be accepted as easily. Determination of the
maximum good would seem to require policy decisions which might well
deprive some individuals of access . It also might prevent autonomous acts
on the part ofthose individuals who could be excluded on the presumption
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that their access (and associated presumed utilization) might prevent
application of the maximum good requirement.
It appears feasible to apply three of Veatch's principles to health care.
Autonomy, consumer-centered beneficence and equal distribution of
access do not appear to conflict. To avoid conflict, it appears that
maximum good must be monitored and presuma bly, it will be limited by
available resources allocated.
What happens if we include the concept of limits in the principle of full
beneficence? (This presumes a limit on various kinds of resources, so that
what is available is in adequate but not limited supply for everyone.) If
access to health care is considered in the sa me context as access to food
(when there is abundance), what result does this give?
A special problem in health care is that user expectations often exceed
the effectively available (or reasonably affordable) supply.20 If total
expectations are matched by total available resources, then this problem
can be resolved. This is a two-sided equation which can be modified by
changing either expectations or resources. Applying our social-oriented
principles requires a societal allocation of resources which allow equal
access to the basic needs. This satisfies the requirement of justice and full
beneficence. It does leave problems for autonomy and user-centered
beneficence. It would deprive individuals of the access to esoteric
resources, in part, perhaps, frustrating their autonomy and limiting their
possible benefit. The challenge, of course, is to have user expectations
which allow both limits and adequate resources.
Applying the principle of "full beneficence", it seems a reasonable
application that procedures and resources in health care should be
developed which can do the most good and avoid any type of "elitism."
Rawls's Theory of Justice
The next theory I would like to apply is that of John Rawls .21 Rawls's
theory is based on distributive justice, and has been applied particularly to
health care by Norman Daniels. 22 Rawls presents a concept of justice in
which fairness is the center, but argues that fairness and justice are not the
same. In Rawls's concept, all persons "participating in a practice are
affected by it as an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible
with a like liberty for all others", and secondly, that "inequalities are
arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for
everyone's advantage, and provided that positions in offices to which they
attach or from which they may be gained are open to all". For Rawls ,
justice involves a triad of liberty, equality, and a reward for service which
contributes to the common good. Although health care is not given a
special place in society by Rawls , Daniels suggests it clearly occupies, or
should occupy, a special place. As noted earlier, this is now true , although
it may not have been in the past. This is due to social, medical and
economic changes which have taken place in recent years. As Veatch has
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argued, the major problem with assigning Rawlsian principles to health
care is that the needs are much more diverse for health care than they are
for such things as food, shelter and clothing. Illness is not uniformly
distributed throughout society. Some people, throughout their entire life,
have virtually no need for access to health care, while others may require
either extensive health care from birth to death (which may occur in few or
many years), and still others may have catastrophic episodes of
intermittent major need. Bread, water, vegetables, and the few basic food s
may sustain one throughout life; the pattern for food intake is relatively
uniform for the vast majority of people, but the distribution of illness and
the variety of illnesses is so diverse that no close parallel exists.
It is possible that a Rawlsian approach which ' recognizes limits is
feasible. It may require a modification of expectations of those who seek
entitlement, and a restructuring of benefits so that they accrue to the least
advantaged (the person in the original position) and not to the
entrepreneur. One such system meeting that condition is a national health
service.
Health care is a right in the context of our current .historical setting. A
major dilemma which remains is that under current patterns of care, there
is inadequate access to many members of American society. These
individuals are typically the least advantaged and often, because of the
standing in society, the most needy. It is apparent that neither a libertarian
nor utilitarian theory will result in equality of access to basic needs. That
access to basic health care is a fundamental right must be recognized.
Solutions, even if they require fundamental changes in health care and its
delivery, must be found. Justice requires that.
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